Airline Tickets & Alleged Credit Card Fraud

"$20 million airline-ticket fraud aided by hotel workers, prosecutors say" mentioned that suspected identity thieves and their supposed co-conspirators were indicted for allegedly using stolen credit card information to purchase airline tickets.  These tickets are believed to have been sold on the U.S. black market at steep discounts to airline passengers. 

 

A July 9th press release describing the indictments quoted a U.S. prosecutor as saying: 'What began as a local law enforcement investigation ultimately exposed an extensive nationwide black market for airline tickets.'  The U.S. black market is of course not the only way airline passengers might acquire tickets connected to alleged credit card frauds. 

 

Jamaican authorities for example, are investigating Montego Bay, Jamaica resident Andrew Hemmings, about his possible acquisition of Spirit Airlines' tickets during a suspected credit card fraud.  To obtain evidence about this alleged fraud originating in Jamaica, Jamaican authorities issued the following legal assistance request / letter rogatory:
 

 

(Click On The Legal Assistance Request To Read It)

 

 

Copyright 2010 Fred L. Abrams

Illegally Accessing Customer Information At U.S. Banks

Bank secrecy laws enable bank customers to entrust their confidential financial information to banks across the globe, as the OECD explains at page 19,  29 of "Improving Access To Bank Information For Tax Purposes". 

 

By obligating banks to protect a bank customer's confidential information, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (b) provides bank secrecy in the United States:

(b) Financial institutions safeguards

In furtherance of the policy in subsection (a) of this section, each agency or authority described in section 6805(a) of this title shall establish appropriate standards for the financial institutions subject to their jurisdiction relating to administrative, technical, and physical safeguards -

(1) to insure the security and confidentiality of customer records and information;

(2) to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such records; and

(3) to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such records or information which could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.

 

Despite the existence of the above-cited bank secrecy law, some still try to illegally access U.S. bank customer information.  The fact pattern I described at "Violating Federal Law In An Asset Search" could be such a case.  It mentioned how a bank employee or "insider" may have accessed a bank's computer system to illegally search for financial intelligence about a divorcing spouse.

 

Continue Reading...

Asset Search News Roundup: January 1, 2010

The "Asset Search News Roundup: January 26, 2009 " mentioned that Heartland Payment Systems was subjected to what might have been the biggest credit / debit card information theft in the U.S.  Mr. Albert Gonzalez was ultimately indicted for that privacy law violation / computer intrusion and other ones.  In fact, Mr. Gonzalez pleaded guilty to criminal charges respectively brought in New Jersey, New York and Massachusetts. 

 

As "Using Foreign Computer Evidence Against An Accused Hacker" indicated, Mr. Gonzalez had initially been accused of using multiple jurisdictions / cross-border elements to facilitate computer hacking, identity theft and money laundering.  A December 29th Department of Justice press release also apparently indicated that Mr. Gonzalez had used cross-border elements to commit his crimes. 

 

According to the December 29th press release, Mr. Gonzalez was an "international hacker" convicted because of "coordination across....geographical lines".  Page 7 paragraph (1) (c) of a November 20, 2009 plea agreement additionally suggests that Mr. Gonzalez used cross-border elements in his crimes.  It stated that he had leased or controlled computer servers in Latvia and Ukraine:

 

  (To Read The Plea Agreement, Click On It)

 

 

Copyright 2010 Fred L. Abrams

Committing Bank Fraud Through Identity Thefts

An August 25 Newsweek article mentioned that Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke had fallen prey to identity thieves after Mr. Bernanke's wife had her purse stolen.  One of the people believed to have been responsible for that identity theft is Clyde Austin Gray, Jr.  Mr. Gray had conspired to commit identity theft nationwide, according to the single-count criminal information in U.S.A. v. Gray, Index No. l:09-CR-00326.  A July 22, 2009 factual statement shows that Mr. Gray was a ringleader who had stolen over 2.1 million dollars from at least ten financial institutions such as SunTrust Bank of Atlanta and M & T Trust in Buffalo. 

 

He and other identity thieves had acquired bank account numbers, credit cards, driver's licenses and other identifying information through pick pocketing, mail theft, the use of "insiders" at professional offices, etc.  The August 25th Newsweek article additionally mentioned that Mr. Gray pleaded guilty in July to conspiracy to commit bank fraud (18 U.S.C. §1349).  The Newsweek article also observed that identity thieves can victimize both the "mighty and powerful" and "hapless consumers".  

 

In a completely different identity theft case I have written about, a major illegal narcotics trafficker lost the $6.3 million he had hidden in a Cayman Island bank account.  As set forth in "A Tax Fraud & Identity Theft From Miami", that trafficker's $6.3 million was transferred by an identity thief from the Cayman Island bank account to Mexico.  The identity thief had accomplished this transfer by impersonating the trafficker in two letters to the Cayman Island bank.

 

The trafficker however, soon learned that he had lost his millions because of the identity thief's letters and then killed the identity thief.  Sanitized copies of these letters used by the identity thief to impersonate the trafficker, are reproduced below:

 

Click On The Above Letters For A Better View

  

 

Copyright 2009 Fred L. Abrams

Using Foreign Computer Evidence Against An Accused Hacker

Albert Gonzalez was arrested in the Southern District of Florida on May 8, 2008 pursuant to this warrant:

Click On The Arrest Warrant To Enlarge It

 

The arrest arose out of Mr. Gonzalez's alleged computer hacking / identity theft scheme which was later outlined in a May 14, 2008 New York superseding indictment.  This superseding indictment in U.S.A. v. Yastremskiy, et. al., 08-cr-00160, claimed that Mr. Gonzalez and his co-defendants had stolen credit card information through computer intrusions at Dave & Busters, Inc. restaurants.  Mr. Gonzalez and / or his co-defendants were accused of violating federal laws including but not limited to: conspiracy (18 U.S.C. §371); fraud related to computers (18 U.S.C. §1030); wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §1343 ); access device fraud (18 U.S.C. §1029); aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. §1028A); etc.  

 

Almost three months after the superseding indictment was filed against him in New York, Mr. Gonzalez was next indicted in Massachusetts.  According to the August 5, 2008 Massachusetts indictment in U.S.A. v. Albert Gonzalez, 08-cr-10233, Mr. Gonzalez had hacked computers which stored credit card information for BJ's Wholesale Club, DSW, OfficeMax, Boston Market and others.

 

Like the New York superseding indictment, the Massachusetts indictment accused Mr. Gonzalez of: conspiracy (18 U.S.C. §371); fraud related to computers (18 U.S.C. §1030); wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §1343 ); access device fraud (18 U.S.C.§1029); and aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. §1028A).  The Massachusetts indictment also essentially asserted that Mr. Gonzalez had hidden the proceeds of his hacking / identity theft scheme by money laundering through multiple jurisdictions.

 

Continue Reading...

The Element Of Identity Theft In Different White-Collar Crimes

Identity theft can play a role in white-collar crimes ranging from money laundering to tax fraud.  Perhaps most interesting are the schemes which share identity theft and money laundering as common elements, like the one mentioned at "A Tax Fraud & Identity Theft From Miami".  Identity theft and money laundering are similarly alleged to have occurred in the case of U.S.A. v. Renee Gill Pratt, et. al. Criminal No. 2:08-cr-00140. 

 

The May 22, 2009 superseding indictment in Pratt, alleges that former Louisiana state representative and New Orleans city councilwoman Renee Gill Pratt participated in a RICO criminal enterprise which misappropriated government funds and concealed assets.  Said superceding indictment contains a total of thirty-four counts alleging money laundering, aggravated identity theft and other crimes, as mentioned by an FBI press release.

 

Identity theft is of course, not just limited to cases involving money laundering.  In U.S.A. vs. Torrella et. al. 3:07-cr-05775 for example, data brokers Emilio and Brandy Torrella pleaded guilty on May 20, 2008 to violating 18 U.S.C. §1028A (aggravated identity theft), among other things.  As my post "Pretexting During An Asset Search" explained, the Torrellas were accused with private detectives, of illegally obtaining confidential information from the I.R.S., Social Security Administration, pharmacies, medical offices and various state labor departments. 

 

The Torrellas had violated people's privacy rights and committed aggravated identity theft by making pretext calls, (i.e. eliciting information by using false identities / false pretenses in telephone calls).  They are now scheduled for sentencing before the Court on July 10, 2009. 

    

Copyright 2009 Fred L. Abrams  

Asset Search News Roundup: March 7, 2009

The "Asset Search News Roundup" for this week explores the vital role financial institutions have in detecting assets concealed through money laundering.  This kind of  issue arose in a most recent phone conversation I had with an investigator who works for a Financial Intelligence Unit located offshore.  The investigator had read one of my articles herein and decided to contact me for additional information about that article. 

 

During our telephone conversation we ended up talking about one specific case which had involved a financial institution residing in the investigator's jurisdiction. In that case, the financial institution had been used as a repository for the illicit proceeds of a financial fraud involving multiple jurisdictions.  The financial institution had "washed" the illicit proceeds as a "laundering link" in a money laundering circuit.

 

The investigator mentioned that once the money laundering scheme was finally uncovered, employees of that particular financial institution had to be given additional training-- presumably on spotting money laundering "red flags", reporting suspicious activity, etc.  All of this highlights the critically important role employees at financial institutions have in detecting and / or preventing money laundering.  I also examined this same role of some financial institutions in money laundering schemes, in the following articles:

  1. "A Tax Fraud & Identity Theft From Miami"
  2. "Concealing Cash By Laundering In Lithuania"
  3. "Fighting Financial Fraud At UK Banks"

 

Copyright 2009 Fred L. Abrams

Asset Search News Roundup: January 26, 2009

This "Asset Search News Roundup" discusses criminal liability for hiding assets via money laundering in Mexico; a computer intrusion at Heartland Payment Systems which may have compromised tens of millions of credit / debit card transactions; and the sentencing of a man for identity theft after he was caught with 66 counterfeit driver's licenses:

 

1.  The Mutual Evaluation Report of Mexico, (released by the Financial Action Task Force on January 12), mentions that criminal liability for money laundering and / or terrorist financing in Mexico, has yet to meet international standards.  Paragraph 5 at page 3 of the Report's Executive Summary expressly states this.  Pages 4-5 of the Report's Executive Summary also detail some of the deficiencies in Mexico's legal system for regulating money laundering.

 

2.  What could be the largest theft of credit / debit card information to date, recently occurred at payment processor Heartland Payment Systems of Princeton, New Jersey.   As reported by The Washington Post, tens of millions of credit / debit card transactions may have been recorded by a hacker using malicious software on Heartland's processing network.  A press release describes how MasterCard and Visa first reported suspicious activity to Heartland, which then used forensic auditors to uncover the computer intrusion.

 

3.  This past Friday, David Lorenzo Fletcher was sentenced to prison for identity theft (18 U.S.C. §1028), in U.S.A. v. Fletcher.  Mr. Fletcher was given a sentence of eight years and five months in federal court after he was initially indicted on July 26, 2007 for both identity theft and alleged possession of counterfeit securities (18. U.S.C. §513 {a}).  According to the article "Man sentenced for identity-related crime", Mr. Fletcher had been stopped by a state trooper and at that time possessed: 66 counterfeit Missouri driver's licenses, 5 Social Security cards from other people, 6 Texas temporary driving permits, 8 forged payroll checks, along with $3,909 cash. 

 

Copyright 2009 Fred L. Abrams

Asset Search News Roundup: October 22, 2008

Some people commit identity theft or aggravated identity theft and then hide their illicit gains by laundering them.  This Asset Search News Roundup is therefore about both identity theft and money laundering:

  • Former Drexel student Jocelyn Kirsch was sentenced on October 17th to five years in prison for aggravated identity theft, money laundering and criminal conspiracy.  A criminal information filed against Ms. Kirsch and her co-conspirator Edward Anderton, had accused the two of laundering the proceeds from identity thefts through bank and PayPal accounts.
  • As explained at the October 21st article "ID theft: money laundering case", Australian authorities arrested a 29-year old who had allegedly belonged to an identity theft gang and laundered over $280,000.  The 29-year old was the 21st person criminally charged because of Operation Hickey, which was commenced in  Australia in 2006 to investigate identity theft.
  • "Criminals look for fall guys in identity theft scam", mentioned how an identity theft scam in the U.K. uses unsuspecting money mules to launder money.  The U.K. trade association APACS, issued a September 25 press release about such recruitment of money mules in the UK.  A recent WalesOnline article also briefly described the case of a British student who was solicited by e-mail to became a money mule.

 

Copyright 2008 Fred L. Abrams

Pretexting During An Asset Search

Privacy and other federal laws generally prohibit pretexting, (the use of false pretenses), when contacting a U.S. bank, phone company or government agency for confidential information.  One example of pretexting would be using a false identity while phoning a bank to elicit a bank customer's personal account information.  If an information broker, private investigator, etc. pretexts during an asset search, some of the following federal statutes might possibly apply:

  • 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Unfair methods of competition unlawful; prevention by Commission):  By relying on both 15 U.S.C. §45 and 15 U.SC. § 53 (False advertisements; injunctions and restraining orders), the Federal Trade Commission can sue pretexters for fraudulent, deceptive and unfair business practices.
  • H.R. 4709, 109th Congress (2006) (Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006):  This statute generally prohibits telephone record pretexting and the sale of illegally acquired telephone records.
  • 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (Fraud and related activity in connection with identification documents, authentication features, and information):  Both this statute & 18 U.S.C. §1028A. (Aggravated identity theft), prohibit a broad range of frauds in connection with identification documents.
  • 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Frauds and swindles): Covers frauds which use U.S. mail.  It and 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television), are the ubiquitous federal fraud statutes.
  • 26 U.S.C. § 7213 (Unauthorized disclosure of information): Prohibits the unauthorized inspection or disclosure of U.S. tax returns or return information.   Subsection (a) (4), entitled "Solicitation", expressly covers the illegal sale and /or illegal receipt of tax return information.
  • 42 U.S.C. § 1307 (Penalty for fraud): Among other things, covers misconduct like eliciting social security numbers through pretext calls to the U.S. Social Security Administration.
  •  47 U.S.C. § 222 (The Telecommunications Act of 1996):  Section (c) (2) of this Act generally prohibits telephone record disclosure absent  "...affirmative written request by the customer, to any person designated by the customer".

One who pretexts in violation of the foregoing statutes, may face a Federal Trade Commission lawsuit or even criminal indictment.  In Federal Trade Commission v. Action Research Group, Inc. et. al. for example, information brokers ended up stipulating to a final order which permanently enjoined them from telephone record pretexting.  In Federal Trade Commission v. Victor L. Guzzeta d/b/a Smart Data Systems, yet another information broker stipulated to a final judgment, which similarly enjoined him from financial record pretexting.


In the U.S. District Court in Tacoma however, Mr. and Mrs. Torrella are being criminally prosecuted for their pretext calls to the I.R.S., Social Security Administration, pharmacies, medical offices and various state labor departments.  According to their indictment, the Torrellas made the pretext calls while performing asset searches and other services for the private investigators who are their co-defendants. 


The Torrellas and /or their co-defendants are charged with Conspiracy and violating many of the above-cited federal statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Wire Fraud); 42 U.S.C. § 1307 (Penalty for Fraud); 26 U.S.C. § 7213 (Unauthorized  Disclosure of Information); and 18 U.S.C. §1028A (Aggravated Identity Theft).  Based on their May 20, 2008 plea agreements, both Mr. and Mrs. Torrella await sentencing.  According to a September 3, 2008 entry in their docket report, said sentencing has been scheduled by U.S. District Court Judge Ronald B. Leighton for February 13, 2009.

(Last Edited 11/3/08)

Copyright 2008 Fred L. Abrams

A Tax Fraud & Identity Theft From Miami

The following occurred over a four month period during 2002, and has been supplied by an investigator I have worked with.  Some of it has been changed / sanitized for privacy reasons: 
 

The Tax Fraud

As part of his tax fraud, Mr. Wallace contacted a Cayman Island bank by mail in order to open a personal account with it.  He mailed account opening documents to it which included a copy of his U.S. passport and also supplied the names of references. According to these documents, Mr. Wallace lived in Miami and was a real estate developer.  Based upon all of the foregoing, the Cayman Island bank opened Mr. Wallace's personal account with a "O" balance.  Just six days later however, bank "X" in Panama wired $6.3 million to Mr. Wallace's Cayman account without any mention of the remitter. 


Mr. Wallace then went on a business trip to Central America for several months; so he rented his Miami home to "Chuck".  Although Mr. Wallace hadn't known at the time, Chuck was a small-time crook.  In fact, soon after Chuck took possession of Mr. Wallace's home, Chuck started stealing Mr. Wallace's mail.  One of the letters Chuck had stolen was written by "Bob", a personal banker from the Cayman Island Bank where Mr. Wallace maintained his account.  Bob had written to Mr. Wallace about a lucrative investment opportunity. 

 

The Identity Theft

Surmising from Bob's letter that Mr. Wallace had a sizable bank account, Chuck wrote to Bob pretending to be Mr. Wallace.  As the sanitized copy of Chuck's First Letter can only partly demonstrate, Chuck had assumed Mr. Wallace's identity in that particular letter by forging Mr. Wallace's signature.  To comfort Bob, Chuck's First Letter had also asked Bob for the minimum balance required to keep Mr. Wallace's account open. Chuck's "softening up" letter further suggested to Bob that Mr. Wallace's funds might soon be needed "at very short notice" for an alleged real estate deal in Mexico.  In the sanitized copy of Chuck's Second Letter, Chuck again pretended to be Mr. Wallace as he wrote to Bob at the Cayman Island Bank.  In his Second Letter, Chuck directed the wire transfer of Mr. Wallace's funds from the Cayman Island Bank to Chuck's own bank account in Mexico.


When Mr. Wallace next unexpectedly arrived at the Cayman Island Bank to make a cash withdrawal, he was shocked to learn that his account had been drained.  The Bank then showed Mr. Wallace "his" letters and explained that it had remitted his funds to Mexico just two days earlier because of "his" instructions.  Concluding that his identity had been taken over by Chuck, Mr. Wallace apologized for his error and immediately booked a flight bound for Miami.  Shortly thereafter, Mr. Wallace was arrested while fleeing from his Miami home after having killed Chuck there. 

  

The Investigation

Investigators from the U.S. next paid a visit to the Cayman Island Bank.  Although they had first thought that Chuck had been the true beneficial owner of the Cayman Island account, they discovered that Mr. Wallace was.  Investigators also learned that Mr. Wallace was not just simply a real estate developer involved in a tax fraud / abusive offshore tax avoidance scheme.  Instead, Mr. Wallace was actually a major illegal narcotics trafficker hiding the proceeds of his drug crimes through money laundering.  Investigators finally concluded that much of the foregoing had happened because the Cayman Island Bank had among many other things:

  

  1. Inadequate customer identification procedures / know your customer rules;
     
  2. Permitted Mr. Wallace's account to be opened by mail & also with a  "0" balance;
     
  3. Neglected to contact a single reference mentioned in Mr. Wallace's account opening documents;
     
  4. Failed to recognize suspicious activities like the wire transfer of the $6.3 million from Panama or Chuck's "softening up" letter.

 

Copyright 2008-2010 Fred  L. Abrams

Fighting Financial Fraud At UK Banks

In the United States, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network regulates the customer identification procedures, (a.k.a  "know your customer rules"), at banks.  In order to clarify these procedures, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network issued guidance in January 2004.  These customer identification procedures codified at 31 C.F.R Part 103.121, demonstrate  that there is no discretion as to what information is needed when a new bank customer opens an account.  In the case of a customer who is a U.S. person for example, the minimum requisite information includes: a taxpayer identification number issued by the Internal Revenue Service (i.e. social security or employer identification number); date of birth; residential or business street address; etc.  After obtaining this kind of information, a U.S. bank must then verify it based on a "risk-based" approach.

 

The United Kingdom similarly has rules for checking the identities of its bank customers.  For example, the regulatory body for the financial services industry in the United Kingdom, (the Financial Services Authority or "FSA"), has published its know your customer rules in Discussion Paper 22, at pages 9-13.  This past July, the FSA also published a consumer leaflet mentioning these rules, "Just the facts about proving your identity".  The FSA's leaflet explains that UK law requires an identity check when a new customer opens a bank account and that checking identities helps prevent money laundering, identity theft and terrorist financing.  It further advises that: "Neither the FSA nor the law sets out how firms should check identity.  In most cases firms will follow guidance produced by an independent industry body, the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group".  According to the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group, a number of different documents can be used to prove identity such as a: passport; photo-style driver's license; letter from a social worker or care home manager verifying identity; etc.  As of August 31, 2006, the FSA had also replaced its Money Laundering Sourcebook with the guidance now found in its Senior Management, Systems and Controls Sourcebook, at SYSC 3.2.6 et. seq. 

 

There will however soon be regulatory change with respect to how a bank identifies its customers in the United Kingdom. This is true because the United Kingdom's new Money Laundering Regulations 2007* come into effect on December 15, 2007.  These regulations obligate banks to apply a standard of due diligence, (as determined by a risk-based approach), when they check a new customer's identity.  In many cases, banks will also be required to identify the true beneficial owner of funds.  Since the United Kingdom's rules for identifying bank customers are about to change, I wanted an expert's opinion.  I then called "Mr. London", who has vast experience in the methods used to hide assets as a former vice president of a major global bank in the United Kingdom.  Mr. London knew all about how banks checked their customers' identities, especially because he had been responsible for his bank's financial fraud and money laundering investigations.

 

During our phone conversation Mr. London expressed his belief that, (despite the prospective change in regulation), money laundering, terrorist financing and other financial fraud would likely continue to increase throughout the United Kingdom.  He also suggested that there was little standing in the way of a determined criminal because of the "complicity or misfeasance" of many banks and the use of nominees to open bank accounts.  Since crimes like money laundering and terrorist  financing often extend beyond just one nation's borders, I was left to wonder just what this meant for all of us.

 

 

*Money Laundering Regulations 2007, is reproduced under the terms of Crown Copyright Policy Guidance issued by HMSO

Copyright 2007 Fred L. Abrams