Financial investigators, bankruptcy trustees, judgment creditors, etc., sometimes research**  the following kinds of records / databases as part of a low-cost asset search:

  • Real Estate Searches: Some government databases provide for free real property searches, like New York City’s Automated City Register System (“ACRIS”) at “http://www.nyc.gov/html/dof/html/jump/acris.shtml”.  ACRIS permits one to search for real property owners in New York City by a party’s name, parcel identifiers (such as borough, block and lot numbers), etc.
  • Lawsuits: A beneficial owner’s assets held in the form of personal injury or other type of legal claim, (if any), can sometimes be uncovered via court databases.
  • Federal Courts: After signing up for an access code, “PACER” enables one to conduct low-cost searches of federal courts nationwide.
  • Comprehensive Searches: TransUnion offers “TLOx” which is a fee-based service for attorneys, government authorities, etc. that can be used to search domestic public records.  Records regarding real property, motor vehicles, telephone numbers, can often be accessed.  Yet another comprehensive search service is available at IRB’s website, “http://www.irbsearch.com/“.  These services may provide the names of business associates, neighbors, relatives, etc., and can therefore sometimes be used to identify nominees hiding a beneficial owner’s assets.

Researching real estate, lawsuits or other similar records in some cases may uncover assets concealed by a judgment debtor, bankruptcy debtor or divorcing spouse.  When conducting such computer-based research, one should however, always consider the red flags or indicia mentioned at “Asset Search Indicia For Divorce, Debt Collection & Bankruptcy”.

**L.L. Jones, Concealing Assets In Bankruptcy: What Are the Consequences And How Do Trustees Find The Assets?, Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Presentation: April 24, 2008) (Edited June 28, 2025).

Copyright 2008-2025 Fred L. Abrams

Mr. Reinaldo Cestero is a private investigator and a retired Chief Deputy United States Marshal, who works in Puerto Rico.  I asked Mr. Cestero about the superseding indictment filed in U.S.A. v. Acevedo-Vila, et. al., which charged Puerto Rico’s Governor Anibal Acevedo Vila, (and /or twelve co-defendants), with: conspiracy; false statements; wire fraud; federal program fraud; and filing false tax returns. 

When I inquired whether there was a prevailing view in San Juan about the Governor’s indictment, Mr. Cestero answered: "The trial is supposed to start in February.  The public is split down the middle.  About half think that the Governor has been falsely accused as a result of a conspiracy between the Blue Party [Partido Nuevo Progresista] and the United States.  The other half are disgusted, and  think that the Governor is guilty of public corruption." 

The Governor’s above-mentioned indictment arises from allegations that he had several businessman pay off large unreported campaign debt, in violation of 2 U.S.C. §431 et. seq., the Federal Election Campaign Act.  The first count of the superseding indictment specifically charged violations of 18 U.S.C. §371 (conspiracy);  2 U.S.C. §441a et. seq. (limitations on contributions /  expenditures); and 18 U.S.C. §§1001 (a) (1) & (a) (2) (false statements).  According to the first count, about sixteen collaborators had made illegal off-the-book campaign contributions to the Governor’s political campaign committee.  The collaborators had allegedly paid false invoices issued by a media / public relations company.  The indictment further alleged that said company ultimately applied the paid invoices as credit against debt owed by the Governor’s political campaign committee. 

The first count also essentially alleged that the Governor had used his family, staff and others as nominees or "conduits", to illegally make campaign contributions.  These "conduit contributions" were even sometimes allegedly made with funds from the Governor.  Count one additionally claimed that the Governor, (and/ or one of his associates), had contacted the Office of Management and Budget, the Puerto Rico Housing Department and the Puerto Rico Pension Fund, to promote the business interests of some of the conduit contributors.  Perhaps most interesting however, is that an April 28, 2008 Daily News’ article indicates that the Governor is still running for re-election in Puerto Rico’s November gubernatorial race– despite the fact of his indictment.

Copyright 2008 Fred L. Abrams

At "An Asset Search, Tax Fraud & Divorce ", I described a conversation I had with Brian– a former IRS Special Agent who had also once been a high-ranking official at the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.  In that conversation, Brian suggested that a broad range of criminal statutes were sometimes relevant to a tax fraud investigation.

Such was the case in the IRS tax fraud investigation of Wisconsin businessman Ronald Miserendino, which ended in Mr. Miserendino’s indictment on a variety of charges in U.S.A. v. Miserendino .  As the superseding indictment returned against him indicated, Mr. Miserendino was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 1344 (bank fraud); 18 U.S.C. 1341 (mail fraud); 26 U.S.C. 7201 (tax evasion); and 18 U.S.C. 1956 (h) (conspiracy to commit money laundering).

According to his plea agreement, Mr. Miserendino had illegally concealed assets and was guilty of tax evasion and conspiracy to commit money laundering.  Mr. Miserendino had started concealing assets in 2001 because his wife had filed for a Wisconsin divorce and sought the division of their marital property.  He had therefore used safe deposit boxes and nominees to hide and / or launder assets in multiple jurisdictions, like Australia, Oregon and Hawaii.  Mr. Miserendino had also dissipated his ownership of a Wisconsin real estate development and rental company, by transferring 49 percent of its stock to his son from a prior marriage.  As the Court’s April 21,2008 sentencing minutes and criminal judgment reflect, Mr. Miserendino finally received a sentence of 48 months in prison.

Copyright 2008 Fred L. Abrams

The divorcing spouse was suspected of hiding marital assets & the divorcing spouse’s personal computer may have contained secret financial information.  The divorcing spouse had removed this computer from the marital residence in anticipation of the divorce.  In this situation, a forensic examination of the divorcing spouse’s computer might help.

If given physical access to this particular computer, a forensic computer expert might find stored information about:

  • Personal & Business Finances
  • Purchases
  • Appointments, Calendars & Contacts
  • Communications
  • Relationships

A forensic computer expert could search the computer for active data, archived data and deleted data. This means that a forensic computer expert could collect financial evidence about suspected hidden assets by searching for the names of nominees;  bank account numbers; shell companies, etc.  Any financial evidence discovered by the expert might eventually be used to impeach the above-mentioned divorcing spouse at a deposition or trial.  It could also be provided to private investigators as leads they could research.


Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (a) (1) (A) (ii) & (b) (2) (B), cover the circumstances electronically stored information may be disclosed/forensically examined during federal litigation.  Pursuant to Federal Rule 26, a litigant may also seek the stored information in an opposing party’s digital camera, cell phone, personal digital assistant or global positioning system. Electronically stored information might also sometimes be “material and necessary” under New York law, and therefore disclosed pursuant to N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 3101:

Ҥ 3101. Scope of disclosure. (a) Generally. There shall be full
disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof, by:
(1) a party, or the officer, director, member, agent or employee of a
party;…”

In  Etzion v. Etzion 2008 NY Slip Op 50475(U) (Nassau Sup. Ct. 2008) however, the Court mentioned N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 3101(a), but then denied an ex-wife plaintiff electronic discovery of her ex-husband’s computers.  Although the Court denied the ex-wife’s discovery request under the particular facts of Etzion,  the Etzion decision provides an example of the kind of computer information a litigant might ideally seek from an opposing party.

Copyright 2008-2019 Fred L. Abrams

The following occurred over a four month period during 2002, and has been supplied by an investigator I have worked with.  Some of it has been changed / sanitized for privacy reasons:

The Tax Fraud

As part of his tax fraud, “Mr. Wallace” contacted a Cayman Island bank by mail in order to open a personal account with it.  He mailed account opening documents to it which included a copy of his U.S. passport and also supplied the names of references. According to these documents, Mr. Wallace lived in Miami and was a real estate developer.  Based upon all of the foregoing, the Cayman Island bank opened Mr. Wallace’s personal account with a “O” balance.  Just six days later however, bank “X” in Panama wired $6.3 million to Mr. Wallace’s Cayman account without any mention of the remitter.

Mr. Wallace then went on a business trip to Central America for several months; so he rented his Miami home to “Chuck”.  Although Mr. Wallace hadn’t known at the time, Chuck was a small-time crook.  In fact, soon after Chuck took possession of Mr. Wallace’s home, Chuck started stealing Mr. Wallace’s mail.  One of the letters Chuck had stolen was written by “Bob”, a personal banker from the Cayman Island Bank where Mr. Wallace maintained his account.  Bob had written to Mr. Wallace about a lucrative investment opportunity.

The Identity Theft

Surmising from Bob’s letter that Mr. Wallace had a sizable bank account, Chuck wrote to Bob pretending to be Mr. Wallace.  As the sanitized copy of Chuck’s First Letter can only partly demonstrate, Chuck had assumed Mr. Wallace’s identity in that particular letter by forging Mr. Wallace’s signature.  To comfort Bob, Chuck’s First Letter had also asked Bob for the minimum balance required to keep Mr. Wallace’s account open. Chuck’s “softening up” letter further suggested to Bob that Mr. Wallace’s funds might soon be needed “at very short notice” for an alleged real estate deal in Mexico.  In the sanitized copy of Chuck’s Second Letter, Chuck again pretended to be Mr. Wallace as he wrote to Bob at the Cayman Island Bank.  In his Second Letter, Chuck directed the wire transfer of Mr. Wallace’s funds from the Cayman Island Bank to Chuck’s own bank account in Mexico.

When Mr. Wallace next unexpectedly arrived at the Cayman Island Bank to make a cash withdrawal, he was shocked to learn that his account had been drained.  The Bank then showed Mr. Wallace “his” letters and explained that it had remitted his funds to Mexico just two days earlier because of “his” instructions.  Concluding that his identity had been taken over by Chuck, Mr. Wallace apologized for his error and immediately booked a flight bound for Miami.  Shortly thereafter, Mr. Wallace was arrested while fleeing from his Miami home after having killed Chuck there.

The Investigation

Investigators from the U.S. next paid a visit to the Cayman Island Bank.  Although they had first thought that Chuck had been the true beneficial owner of the Cayman Island account, they discovered that Mr. Wallace was.  Investigators also learned that Mr. Wallace was not just simply a real estate developer involved in a tax fraud / abusive offshore tax avoidance scheme.  Instead, Mr. Wallace was actually a major illegal narcotics trafficker hiding the proceeds of his drug crimes through money laundering.  Investigators finally concluded that much of the foregoing had happened because the Cayman Island Bank had among many other things:

  1. Inadequate bank customer identification procedures / know your customer rules;
  2. Permitted Mr. Wallace’s account to be opened by mail & also with a  “0” balance;
  3. Neglected to contact a single reference mentioned in Mr. Wallace’s account opening documents;
  4. Failed to recognize suspicious activities like the wire transfer of the $6.3 million from Panama or Chuck’s “softening up” letter.

Copyright 2008-2015 Fred  L. Abrams

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has disseminated a list with about 1400 suspected tax cheats on it, all of whom maintained offshore bank accounts through Liechtenstein’s LGT Group.  As the CNBC article “Europe Tax Evasion Probe Going Global” mentioned, an LGT employee stole the list in 2002 and eventually sold it to Germany’s foreign intelligence agency.

“Europe Tax Evasion Probe Going Global” also indicates that the 1400 on the list may have hidden assets and / or income from the domestic tax authorities of Germany, the U.S., Britain, Australia, Italy, France, Sweden, Canada and others.  Although LGT’s February 24, 2008 press release, refuted the idea that all 1400 on the list were tax cheats, some of them may soon find themselves indicted for tax fraud in the U.S.  This could be true because the IRS announced in its February 26, 2008 press release, that it was “initiating enforcement action involving more than 100 U.S. taxpayers” on the list.

Last week a national newspaper telephoned me about the list of 1400 suspected tax cheats.  The newspaper wondered if it could retain me to somehow acquire a copy of the list.  Although I was unable to assist the newspaper, I contacted “Roger”, the former intelligence officer mentioned in my post “Following The Money Trail In Zürich”.

“I have no interest in helping reporters, but if you want, maybe I could make a few calls”, Roger said during our conversation about the list.  When I told Roger that as many as 600 on the list may have been Germans, he added:  “Because the German border is next to Liechtenstein, people would sometimes try to smuggle cash across it in the trunks of their cars.  Once in Liechtenstein, a suitcase full of cash could easily be deposited.  That’s one reason Liechtenstein was a haven for hiding organized crime monies.  Liechtenstein has been the back pocket of Germany for years.”

(Edited June 1, 2009)

Copyright Fred L. Abrams 2008

Nathan Vardi’s Forbes.com article "Cash Is King", describes some of the ways funds can be transferred during money laundering:

  • Wire Transfers
  • Credit Cards
  • Prepaid Cards
  • Digital Currency (i.e. E-Gold)
  • Cash

"Cash Is King" also briefly quotes me and mentions that cash is hard to trace.  Illicit cash can of course still be detected, particularly at border crossings, where the cash smuggler may pretend to be just an ordinary airline passenger or motorist.  Law enforcement use a variety of methods to detect cash smugglers, as set forth by the Financial Action Task Force in its February 19, 2010 report, "Detecting And Preventing The Illicit Cross-Border Transportation Of Cash And Bearer Negotiable Instruments (Copyright © FATF/OECD. All rights reserved)". 

As the Financial Action Task Force report mentions, law enforcement can detect smuggling through: canine units, personal interviews, declaration forms, x-ray and other screening methods.  The Financial Action Task Force also has its IX Special Recommendation, which describes the countermeasures effective against cash smugglers. Perhaps most surprising however, is the extraordinary amount of illicit cash which is sometimes hidden and subject to detection. 

For example, in my November 1, 2007 post "Forfeiture  &  The DEA’s Asset Search", I described a conversation I had with a DEA retiree about the Zhenli Ye Gon case.  "Forfeiture & The DEA’s Asset Search" explained how Ye Gon had been suspected of concealing over $207 million dollars of drug proceeds in his Mexico City home.  Based on paragraph 20 of the attached Special Agent’s affidavit, that November post mentioned that Ye Gon had been accused of hiding over $200 million in compartments, false walls, closets and suitcases.

(Edited February 25, 2010)

Copyright 2008-2010 Fred L. Abrams

When an asset search uncovers that a divorcing spouse or ex-husband may be fraudulently hiding assets, it can lead to a civil RICO case.  Plaintiff Christa Ritter’s asset search of her ex-husband for example, ended in the filing of such a RICO case in Ritter v. Klisivitch et. al., Index # 2:06 CV 05511, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York.  Although Plaintiff Ritter’s RICO case is currently the subject of Defendants’ pending dismissal motions, the Court may ultimately permit her to proceed via the following Proposed Complaint:

Plaintiff Ritter’s Proposed Complaint alleges that Defendant Klisivitch had violated RICO laws (18 U.S.C. §1961 et. seq.), through mail, wire and bank fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344); obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. §1503); money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956);  tax fraud (26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7202, 7206); and bankruptcy fraud (18 U.S.C. § 152).  Also according to the Plaintiff, the foregoing had occurred because Defendant had tried to protect his assets from judgments against him arising from the Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s divorce.

Via the Proposed Complaint, Plaintiff alleges some of the common money laundering indicia.  Plaintiff for example, essentially claims that Defendant had transferred money through nominee bank accounts and / or holding companies.  Among other things, the Proposed Complaint further alleges that Defendant had purchased real property through a nominee.

As Klisivitch partly suggests, a civil RICO complaint can sometimes be used as a countermeasure against those suspected of hiding assets related to a divorce.  Another N.Y. litigant for example, (in Ostashko v. Ostashko, No. 00 CV 7162; 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27015 at *50-*82 {E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2002}), used a RICO complaint to set aside her divorcing husband’s fraudulent confession of judgment.  This happened because the Ostashko Court found that the divorcing husband had used his confession of judgment to fraudulently conceal marital assets offshore, in Russia.

Copyright 2008 Fred L. Abrams

As the Philadelphia Inquirer reported on January 18, 2008, ex-Philadelphia lawmaker German Quiles, his wife and daughter, were recently convicted of money laundering in U.S. District Court.   According to a July 13, 2007 Department of Justice press release, the Quiles’ family had earlier been indicted for laundering about $175,900 dollars between Philadelphia and Aruba.  While under investigation by the U.S. Bureau of Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Quiles had laundered what they believed were drug proceeds.  They had used their Money Service Businesses (which cashed checks, wire transferred money and sold traveler’s checks), as a laundering link to wash money.  

According to the Quiles’ indictment, ICE had heavily relied on a confidential informant during its investigation.  Other facts mentioned by the Quiles’ indictment support the conclusion that ICE had also likely recognized a number of money laundering indicia.  In the Quiles’ case, these inidica may have included the use of:

  • a high-risk geographical location to transfer funds (i.e. Aruba).
  • multiple jurisdictions, such as Philadelphia and Aruba.
  • offshore wire transfers.
  • traveler’s checks to convert cash.
  • structured transactions to avoid Bank Secrecy Act reporting requirements.
  • false identification.

In addition to using a confidential informant and recognizing money laundering indicia, ICE also would have scrutinized phone records belonging  to the Quiles.  Any relevant government filings about the Quiles, (like Suspicious Activity Reports filed by U.S. financial institutions), would too most likely have been examined by ICE.  As the website of  Visual Analytics Inc. suggests, law enforcement  agencies like ICE may also sometimes detect money laundering / other crimes by using "data mining" to analyze phone calls or Suspicious Activity Reports.

Copyright 2008 Fred L. Abrams

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et. seq., protects the privacy of customers who provide information to U.S. financial institutions.  Although there are some important exceptions mentioned at 15 U.S.C. §6821(c) – (g), GLBA restricts access to  “nonpublic personal information” like bank account numbers, account balances, etc.  In some cases, GLBA can therefore act as a bar to an asset search at a financial institution.

At 15 U.S.C. §6821, GLBA specifically protects personal information at U.S. financial institutions by outlawing pretexting.  This means for example, that it is illegal to make false statements to a bank customer or a bank in order to access protected personal information.   Submitting false documents to a bank, (to obtain the protected information), is also illegal pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 6821.  Soliciting a person to use false pretenses to access the protected information at a bank, is also prohibited.

Violating GLBA is punishable pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 6823 by a criminal fine or imprisonment of up to five years.  In aggravated cases, fines may also be doubled and imprisonment can be for up to ten years.  As NXIVM Corp. vs. Rick Ross, U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey, Index # 06-CV-01051 demonstrates, a GLBA violation can however, also be alleged in a civil court case.  Although the NXIVM case was commenced as a trademark / copyright violation claim against Mr. Rick Ross, Mr. Ross filed a Verified Counterclaim essentially alleging that NXVIM could have illegally obtained his bank and other private information by hiring private investigator Juval Aviv and /or the Interfor private investigation firm.

According to hearsay allegations at page 8, paragraph 27 of the Verified Counterclaim, Interfor had supposedly bribed Fleet Bank employees to access Mr. Ross’s bank customer information.  The Counterclaim alternatively supplied the hearsay allegation that illegal pretexting could have been used to acquire bank customer information.  Mr. Aviv of Intefor however, denied any wrongdoing at his November 7, 2007 Reply, filed with the Court.

(Edited January 14, 2012)

Copyright 2008 Fred L. Abrams