Could Former Premier Misick Face U.S. Forced Collection Proceedings?

At first glance, there was nothing unusual about the lawsuit filed in New Jersey involving Former Premier Michael Misick of the Turks and Caicos Islands. The complaint in the lawsuit executed by the Former Premier, claimed that Hip Hop Weekly Magazine founders David Mays and Raymond Scott had misappropriated the magazine's cash.  

 

Mr. Mays and Mr. Scott separately alleged in their answer, counterclaim and third-party complaint, that the Former Premier had been an investor in the magazine and was basically one of its owners.  On March 23, 2010, there was a status and settlement conference scheduled in the lawsuit, as mentioned by the Court's docket entry:  

 

(Click On The Above Image To View The Docket Report)

 

"Target Of Corruption Probe Sues Hip-Hoppers For Supposed Fraud" meanwhile, explained that the Former Premier had been the subject of a public corruption probe by the Turks and Caicos Islands Commission of Inquiry.  The Inquiry issued its Redacted Final Report, which had once been available here.   This Final Report asserted that the Former Premier was known to have enjoyed a "Hollywood lifestyle" beyond his salary and allowances as a politician.  It also raised the critical questions: Had the Former Premier been a party to public corruption and could he have taken illicit monies?

 

If a politically exposed person like the Former Premier, actually has engaged in a public corruption scheme, then the scheme's illicit proceeds could become the target of forced collection proceedings.  This result might especially occur if a foreign politically exposed person laundered the illicit proceeds by making investments in the U.S. or otherwise parked assets there. 

 

Foreign governmental authorities might then use a letter rogatory under 28 U.S.C. §1782 (Assistance to foreign and international tribunals and to litigants before such tribunals), to gather evidence from U.S. witnesses about the illicit proceeds.  Governmental authorities could also try to interdict these illicit proceeds in the U.S., through the following federal statutes:

  

 

Note:  On March 3, 2010 Forbes.com mentioned The Asset Search Blog and some of the foregoing at "The Premier And The Hip-Hop Magazine".

 

(Last Edited May 6, 2010) 

Copyright 2010 Fred L. Abrams

Alleged Irregularities At Elektrim Lead Warsaw Prosecutors To Delaware

The Polish power and telecommunications company Elektrim SA has been in bankruptcy proceedings since 2007.  It still controls, (and owns an estimated 47% of),  Zespol Elektrowni Patnow-Adamow-Konin SA ("ZE PAK").  ZE PAK generates about 8.5% of all of Poland's electricity, as was just mentioned by "Enea, ‘Several’ Others Bid for Polish Power Group PAK (Update2)". 

 

Elektrim is also the subject of a criminal investigation by Warsaw prosecutors who have uncovered alleged irregularities believed to have occurred between 1999 and 2002.  They claim that Elektrim may have failed to perform trade agreements and conceivably caused property loss in violation of Article 296 paragraphs 1 & 3 of Poland's Criminal Code.  

 

These same prosecutors additionally appear to be focused on U.S. businesswoman Barbara J. Lundberg, who had been Elektrim's president from 1999 until she was fired in 2001.  Time Magazine's "Mrs. Big's Big Deals" published in 2000, had characterized Ms. Lundberg as "one of Warsaw's most influential executives".  The Warsaw prosecutors meanwhile claimed via their March 21, 2006 letter rogatory pictured below, that there were "changes in the existing profile of the company's business" after Ms. Lundberg became Elektrim's president:

 

 

 (To Read The Letter Rogatory Click On The Image Above)

 

According to the prosecutors' letter rogatory, Ms. Lundberg had possibly facilitated suspicious business deals while she was at Elektrim.  The letter rogatory for instance, speculated at page 3, that Ms. Lundberg might have "received a success fee" and may have otherwise personally benefited from Elektrim's $325 million dollar purchase of shares in the Bresnan International Partners Poland Limited Partnership ("BIP Poland LP").

 

The letter rogatory alleged that while Ms. Lundberg was Elektrim's president, she could have been a director of a U.S. Delaware-based company which might have been the sole partner in BIP Poland LP.  If these allegations are actually true, then Elecktrim's $325 million dollar share purchase in BIP Poland LP may have been between related parties and might not have been at "arm's length".

 

A March 4, 2010 Order from the federal court in Delaware approved the execution of the Warsaw prosecutors' letter rogatory.  The Delaware U.S. Attorney can therefore elicit evidence from the Delaware witnesses mentioned by the letter rogatory.  Said letter rogatory is the fourth one connected to Polish investigations filed in Delaware federal court since October 2009.  I discussed some other Polish investigations at "Following The Money Trail From Poland To Delaware" and / or at "The High-Risk Geographical Location Of Delaware".

(Edited June 13, 2010)

Copyright 2010 Fred L. Abrams

 

A Tax Fraud & Identity Theft From Miami

The following occurred over a four month period during 2002, and has been supplied by an investigator I have worked with.  Some of it has been changed / sanitized for privacy reasons: 
 

The Tax Fraud

As part of his tax fraud, Mr. Wallace contacted a Cayman Island bank by mail in order to open a personal account with it.  He mailed account opening documents to it which included a copy of his U.S. passport and also supplied the names of references. According to these documents, Mr. Wallace lived in Miami and was a real estate developer.  Based upon all of the foregoing, the Cayman Island bank opened Mr. Wallace's personal account with a "O" balance.  Just six days later however, bank "X" in Panama wired $6.3 million to Mr. Wallace's Cayman account without any mention of the remitter. 


Mr. Wallace then went on a business trip to Central America for several months; so he rented his Miami home to "Chuck".  Although Mr. Wallace hadn't known at the time, Chuck was a small-time crook.  In fact, soon after Chuck took possession of Mr. Wallace's home, Chuck started stealing Mr. Wallace's mail.  One of the letters Chuck had stolen was written by "Bob", a personal banker from the Cayman Island Bank where Mr. Wallace maintained his account.  Bob had written to Mr. Wallace about a lucrative investment opportunity. 

 

The Identity Theft

Surmising from Bob's letter that Mr. Wallace had a sizable bank account, Chuck wrote to Bob pretending to be Mr. Wallace.  As the sanitized copy of Chuck's First Letter can only partly demonstrate, Chuck had assumed Mr. Wallace's identity in that particular letter by forging Mr. Wallace's signature.  To comfort Bob, Chuck's First Letter had also asked Bob for the minimum balance required to keep Mr. Wallace's account open. Chuck's "softening up" letter further suggested to Bob that Mr. Wallace's funds might soon be needed "at very short notice" for an alleged real estate deal in Mexico.  In the sanitized copy of Chuck's Second Letter, Chuck again pretended to be Mr. Wallace as he wrote to Bob at the Cayman Island Bank.  In his Second Letter, Chuck directed the wire transfer of Mr. Wallace's funds from the Cayman Island Bank to Chuck's own bank account in Mexico.


When Mr. Wallace next unexpectedly arrived at the Cayman Island Bank to make a cash withdrawal, he was shocked to learn that his account had been drained.  The Bank then showed Mr. Wallace "his" letters and explained that it had remitted his funds to Mexico just two days earlier because of "his" instructions.  Concluding that his identity had been taken over by Chuck, Mr. Wallace apologized for his error and immediately booked a flight bound for Miami.  Shortly thereafter, Mr. Wallace was arrested while fleeing from his Miami home after having killed Chuck there. 

  

The Investigation

Investigators from the U.S. next paid a visit to the Cayman Island Bank.  Although they had first thought that Chuck had been the true beneficial owner of the Cayman Island account, they discovered that Mr. Wallace was.  Investigators also learned that Mr. Wallace was not just simply a real estate developer involved in a tax fraud / abusive offshore tax avoidance scheme.  Instead, Mr. Wallace was actually a major illegal narcotics trafficker hiding the proceeds of his drug crimes through money laundering.  Investigators finally concluded that much of the foregoing had happened because the Cayman Island Bank had among many other things:

  

  1. Inadequate customer identification procedures / know your customer rules;
     
  2. Permitted Mr. Wallace's account to be opened by mail & also with a  "0" balance;
     
  3. Neglected to contact a single reference mentioned in Mr. Wallace's account opening documents;
     
  4. Failed to recognize suspicious activities like the wire transfer of the $6.3 million from Panama or Chuck's "softening up" letter.

 

Copyright 2008-2010 Fred  L. Abrams

Bearer Shares & An Asset Search

As the attached sanitized bearer share certificate suggests, bearer shares allow for anonymous share ownership.  A corporation that issues bearer shares has no central registry of their ownership.  The Financial Action Task Force additionally explains, bearer shares are: "negotiable instruments that accord ownership in a corporation to the person who possesses the bearer share certificate".  Via its 33rd Recommendation and Chapter 4, pages 15-16 of its Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2001-2002, the Financial Action Task Force also warns that bearer shares can be used to launder money.

I too have seen how bearer shares had likely been used to launder marital assets and evade U.S. taxes.  In that particular case, (the facts of which have been changed below for privacy reasons), the divorcing husband and his business partners had accumulated $18 Million in undeclared revenue while residing in the U.S.  The husband and his partners then secretly formed a shell corporation in Curacao, the Dutch Antilles, which they jointly owned through bearer shares. 


To prevent the interdiction of their bearer shares by domestic authorities, the husband and his partners retained a Dutch lawyer to hold the bearer shares in a trust.  As their trustee, the Dutch lawyer deposited the bearer shares into a stock custody account at a Rotterdam bank.  As the following diagram demonstrates, the husband and his partners finally deposited their $18 million in undeclared revenue in a Cayman Island bank account in the name of their Curacao shell company:

 

(Click On The Image To Enlarge It)

 


As described above, the husband and his partners hid their $18 million from the United States by using multiple jurisdictions which included Curacao, Rotterdam and the Cayman Islands.  The husband and his partners also concealed their beneficial ownership of the $18 million by using protective layers consisting of: bearer shares; a nominee shell company from Curacao; and an offshore bank account in the Cayman Islands.  Such layering is characteristic of money laundering and sometimes ends in the kind of tax fraud case filed by the U.S. Department of Justice against Mr. Walter Anderson.  As my post  "A $365 Million Dollar Tax Fraud" mentioned, Mr. Anderson used bearer share certificates and shell companies to conceal the undeclared revenue he had parked offshore.

(Edited January 10, 2010)

Copyright 2008-2010 Fred L. Abrams

Following The Money Trail In Zurich

While "Roger" and I were walking near Bahnhofstrasse Street, Zurich, Roger suddenly stopped and had us duck into a corner shop. Once inside the shop Roger appeared to be looking for a particular item displayed in the shop's front window, although he was really scrutinizing the outside street.  He explained afterwards how it was necessary to check if we were being followed: "But first you must choose a side street or a main street where there are not many pedestrians or traffic, not a busy thoroughfare. You take mental pictures of everyone you think could be potential followers or surveillance cars as you continue along, before entering a store with windows which will permit you to survey the street".


Roger had a knack for locating offshore financial information because of his former work as an intelligence officer.  He and I were in Zurich on our way to meet my local Swiss counsel.  We were following the money trail of a financial fraudster who pretended in his U.S. court case to have a negative net worth.  Roger had brought with him the details of the fraudster's finances, which demonstrated that the fraudster had hidden tens of millions of dollars by money laundering through Switzerland.  Roger was about to share this information with me for the first time, at our meeting with the Swiss counsel.


In some cases, offshore financial information discovered during an asset search suggests that a foreign criminal law has been violated.  In Switzerland for example, one might conceivably violate criminal laws by lying about the beneficial ownership of a bank account, as mentioned in this legal memo from Swiss counsel:

  

 (To Read The Legal Memo, Click On The Image Above)

 

 

Swiss counsel has however, made the following important comments which relate to the information in the legal memo:

 

 "1)  Due in part to the current upheavals concerning the activities of major Swiss banks in the US, the law on financial regulation in Switzerland is somewhat uncertain. Though this is against Swiss legal tradition, the anti-money laundering rules in Switzerland follow what I believe is international practice in deliberately using a degree if vagueness about the exact standards to be applied so as to induce a "chilling effect". This uncertainty is rendered more acute by the difficulty of assessing the interaction between the laws of various nations. 

 
Note also that the rules and regulations have created a web of disclosures and of duties to investigate. It will be a brave person who in search of fiscal relief will navigate through this web without fear of having to make any misleading or materially wrong declaration (thus doing more than mere non-disclosure).
 
One practical result of the current problems with the US is that banks and Financial Intermediaries in Switzerland (and elsewhere in Europe) have simply stopped dealing with US nationals or US residents (except possibly through US based "on shore subsidiaries" of foreign banks), to the extent of closing long standing business relationships even in the absence of any specific allegation of wrongdoing, fiscal or otherwise. Thus while the law may not have changed, the climate in which the law operates has.
 
2)  In step with this development, the required standard of care expected of a Financial Intermediary (including a bank) is much higher and increasing continuously. Today quite sophisticated profiling and automatic monitoring of all transactions is routine. The effect of this is the same as mentioned above, the law has not fundamentally changed but the loopholes have become very small in practice.  Mere "non disclosure" is only effective if nobody asks.  Note also that current practice requires on-ongoing checks, not merely checks at the opening of the account bur also during its operation."          
 
 

 

(Edited February 1, 2010)

Copyright 2007-2010 Fred L. Abrams

Money Laundering, Marital Assets & Divorce

Money laundering circuits sometimes operate in the U.S. through domestic bank accounts used as "laundering links".  It is also true that money laundering circuits washing vast sums of money, will typically do so through offshore bank accounts located in tax havens like Switzerland, Luxembourg, the Cayman Islands, etc.  Such was the case of one divorcing husband, (the depiction of whom is altered below for privacy reasons), who laundered his U.S. money between Switzerland and Germany.

Prior to the valuation / equitable distribution hearing in his divorce case, the husband alleged that he had a liability of $29 million owed to a prime bank in Germany because of an arm's length business loan.  An investigation however revealed that his loan was back-to-back , (i.e. a fully collateralized loan in which the borrower and the lender are one and the same).  The husband had first secretly deposited $30 million into a Swiss bank account and next used that same $30 million to collateralize a Swiss bank guarantee for $29 million.  By then using that Swiss bank guarantee as full collateral, the husband persuaded a German bank to issue a personal bank loan to him for $29 million to be disbursed in Germany.


After the loan principal was disbursed to him in Germany, the husband intentionally failed to repay his $29 million debt due and owing to the German bank.  The husband's loan default meant that the German bank would collect $29 million transferred from Switzerland pursuant to the Swiss bank guarantee which had served as loan collateral.  As the link chart below suggests, the loan default in Germany was actually the very means used to wash the money the husband had earlier deposited in Switzerland:

 

(Click On The Link Chart To Enlarge)


The husband's financial transfers shown above had no economic benefit, as is usually the case where a back-to-back loan is used to hide assets.  Back-to-back loans however, are not only sometimes used to conceal marital assets during a divorce. They can also regrettably be used in a tax fraud to hide assets and income; by a debtor hiding assets from a creditor; or as a means to disguise monies which are the proceeds of a white-collar or other crime.

 

(Edited January 22, 2010)

Copyright 2007-2010 Fred L. Abrams