Hiding / Smuggling Cash

Nathan Vardi's Forbes.com article "Cash Is King", describes some of the ways funds can be transferred during money laundering:

  • Wire Transfers
  • Credit Cards
  • Prepaid Cards
  • Digital Currency (i.e. E-Gold)
  • Cash
"Cash Is King", also mentions that cash is hard to trace.  In some cases illicit cash can of course still be detected.  This is particularly true at border crossings, where the cash smuggler may pretend to be just an ordinary airline passenger or motorist.  Law enforcement use a variety of methods to detect cash smugglers, as set forth by the Financial Action Task Force in its February 12, 2005 report, "Detecting And Preventing The Cross-Border Transportation Of Cash By Terrorists And Other Criminals (Copyright © FATF/OECD. All rights reserved)". 


As the Financial Action Task Force report mentions, law enforcement can detect smuggling through: canine units, personal interviews, declaration forms, x-ray and other screening methods.  The Financial Action Task Force also has its IX Recommendation, which describes the countermeasures effective against cash smugglers. Perhaps most surprising however, is the extraordinary amount of illicit cash which is sometimes hidden and subject to detection. 


For example, in my November 1, 2007 post "Forfeiture  &  The DEA's Asset Search", I described a conversation I had with a DEA retiree about the Zhenli Ye Gon case.  "Forfeiture & The DEA's Asset Search" explained how Ye Gon had been suspected of concealing over $207 million dollars of drug proceeds in his Mexico City home.  Based on paragraph 20 of the attached Special Agent's affidavit, that November post mentioned that Ye Gon had been accused of hiding over $200 million in compartments, false walls, closets and suitcases.


Copyright 2008  Fred L. Abrams

Money Laundering Typologies

A licensed private investigator from Arizona advised that he had a good track record in finding  hidden assets and / or locating bank accounts.  He however, contacted me wanting to know the best way to learn more about money laundering (18 U.S.C. §§1956 & 1957) and structuring / smurfing (31 U.S.C. § 5324).  One good way to learn about money laundering and other white-collar crimes, is to read money laundering typologies.  


As explained at the end of my post Terrorist Financing, Money Laundering & Financial Intelligence Units, money laundering typologies are sometimes used by law enforcement and regulators to develop countermeasures against emerging criminal trends.  Although"100 Cases from the Egmont Group" arises from data collected by the Egmont Group from the 1990's, it is still relevant today.  In "100 Cases from the Egmont Group" there are for example, descriptions of the following laundering methods:

  • Concealment within existing business structures
  • Misuse of legitimate businesses
  • Use of false identities, documents or straw men
  • Exploiting international jurisdictional issues
  • Use of anonymous asset types
The Financial Action Task Force also publishes money laundering typologies.  Its February 29, 2008 Terrorist Financing Typologies Report, (Copyright © FATF/OECD. All rights reserved), explains some of the methods terrorists use to raise and then transfer illicit funds. In addition to the foregoing, the Egmont Group and the Financial Action Task Force publish many money laundering typologies at their websites.


Copyright 2008 Fred L. Abrams

Fighting Financial Fraud At UK Banks

In the United States, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network regulates the customer identification procedures, (a.k.a  "know your customer rules"), at banks.  In order to clarify these procedures, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network issued guidance in January 2004.  These customer identification procedures codified at 31 C.F.R Part 103.121, demonstrate  that there is no discretion as to what information is needed when a new bank customer opens an account.  In the case of a customer who is a U.S. person for example, the minimum requisite information includes: a taxpayer identification number issued by the Internal Revenue Service (i.e. social security or employer identification number); date of birth; residential or business street address; etc.  After obtaining this kind of information, a U.S. bank must then verify it based on a "risk-based" approach.


The United Kingdom similarly has rules for checking the identities of its bank customers.  For example, the regulatory body for the financial services industry in the United Kingdom, (the Financial Services Authority or "FSA"), has published its know your customer rules in Discussion Paper 22, at pages 9-13.  This past July, the FSA also published a consumer leaflet mentioning these rules, "Just the facts about proving your identity".  The FSA's leaflet explains that UK law requires an identity check when a new customer opens a bank account and that checking identities helps prevent money laundering, identity theft and terrorist financing.  It further advises that: "Neither the FSA nor the law sets out how firms should check identity.  In most cases firms will follow guidance produced by an independent industry body, the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group".  According to the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group, a number of different documents can be used to prove identity such as a: passport; photo-style driver's license; letter from a social worker or care home manager verifying identity; etc.  As of August 31, 2006, the FSA had also replaced its Money Laundering Sourcebook with the guidance now found in its Senior Management, Systems and Controls Sourcebook, at SYSC 3.2.6 et. seq. 


There will however soon be regulatory change with respect to how a bank identifies its customers in the United Kingdom. This is true because the United Kingdom's new Money Laundering Regulations 2007 come into effect on December 15, 2007.  These regulations obligate banks to apply a standard of due diligence, (as determined by a risk-based approach), when they check a new customer's identity.  In many cases, banks will also be required to identify the true beneficial owner of funds.  Since the United Kingdom's rules for identifying bank customers are about to change, I wanted an expert's opinion.  I then called "Mr. London", who has vast experience in the methods used to hide assets as a former vice president of a major global bank in the United Kingdom.  Mr. London knew all about how banks checked their customers' identities, especially because he had been responsible for his bank's financial fraud and money laundering investigations.


During our phone conversation Mr. London expressed his belief that, (despite the prospective change in regulation), money laundering, terrorist financing and other financial fraud would likely continue to increase throughout the United Kingdom.  He also suggested that there was little standing in the way of a determined criminal because of the "complicity or misfeasance" of many banks and the use of nominees to open bank accounts.  Since crimes like money laundering and terrorist  financing often extend beyond just one nation's borders, I was left to wonder just what this meant for all of us.


Copyright 2007 Fred L. Abrams

Terrorist Financing, Money Laundering & Financial Intelligence Units

The Financial Intelligence Units of the 106 different jurisdictions in the Egmont Group, exchange information worldwide to track terrorist financing and fight crimes like money laundering.  Their exchange of information occurs pursuant to the Egmont Group's Principles for Information Exchange (June 2001) and Best Practices for the Exchange of Information (updated June 2004).  Sometimes Financial Intelligence Units ("FIU's") share information from a suspicious activity or suspicious transaction report filed by a bank or other entity.  This can happen especially because FIU's are the repository of the suspicious activity/transaction reports filed in their respective jurisdictions.  


As the World Bank's 2004 report "Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview" mentions, various jurisdictions define suspicious activity differently.  In the United States however, there are extensive rules about filing a Suspicious Activity Report.  Banks in the United States for example, are required by both 31U.S.C. §5318 (g) and 31 C.F.R Part 103.18 to file a Suspicious Activity Report with the FIU known as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.  As 31 C.F.R. Part 103.18 explains, a bank is generally required to file a Suspicious Activity Report within thirty days of a transaction which amounts to at least $5000 and: involves funds derived from crime; or disguises criminal activity; or evades reporting requirements; or has no apparent lawful purpose.  According to Guidance on Preparing A Complete & Sufficient Suspicious Activity Report Narrative, remembering the five "W's", (i.e. who, what, where, when, & why), is particularly helpful when supplying information in a Suspicious Activity Report to a FIU.
  

FIU's also study the methods used to launder money and then develop laundering "typologies" about them.  One such typology, Egmont Group Case Ref: 06058, shows how information about two suspicious trusts collected by the FIU of one country was passed on as a tip to a different country.  Yet another typology, Egmont Group Case Ref: 06063, demonstrates how a FIU analyzed wire transfers from Europe in order to spot two suspected members of a terrorist group involved in the 9/11 tragedy.  Finally, FIU typologies are used by law enforcement and regulators to track emerging criminal trends and develop countermeasures to financial crimes like money laundering. 


Copyright 2007 Fred L. Abrams