Money Laundering In The U.K.

As the Anti Money Laundering Blog mentioned on April 1, 2008, the U.S. State Department has listed the United Kingdom as a Major Money Laundering Country in 2008.  The State Department however, had also previously listed the United Kingdom as a Major Money Laundering Country in 2007.


The State Department releases its list of Major Money Laundering Countries as part of its annual International Control Narcotics Strategy Report.  At its Country Reports, the 2008 International Control Narcotics Strategy Report mentions that, among other things: 

"The UK should develop legislation and clearly enforceable implementing regulations to ensure that beneficial owners are identified and verified and that customer due diligence is required and ongoing, regardless of an already established relationship with the client."

In my October 8, 2007 post, "Fighting Financial Fraud At U.K. Banks", I too raised the issue of the effectiveness of some of the anti-money laundering regulation in the United Kingdom.  That particular post was partly based on a discussion I had with "Mr. London", who had investigated money laundering in the United Kingdom as a former vice president of a global bank.  Mr. London had suggested during our discussion, that money laundering would likely increase in the United Kingdom because of the "complicity  or misfeasance" of banks and the use of nominees to open bank accounts.   

Copyright 2008 Fred L. Abrams

A Tax Fraud & Identifty Theft From Miami

The following occurred over a four month period during 2002, and has been supplied by an investigator I have worked with.  Some of it has been changed / sanitized for privacy reasons: 
 
The Tax Fraud

As part of his tax fraud, Mr. Wallace contacted a Cayman Island bank by mail in order to open a personal account with it.  He mailed account opening documents to it which included a copy of his U.S. passport and also supplied the names of references. According to these documents, Mr. Wallace lived in Miami and was a real estate developer.  Based upon all of the foregoing, the Cayman Island bank opened Mr. Wallace's personal account with a "O" balance.  Just six days later however, bank "X" in Panama wired $6.3 million to Mr. Wallace's Cayman account without any mention of the remitter. 


Mr. Wallace then went on a business trip to Central America for several months; so he rented his Miami home to "Chuck".  Although Mr. Wallace hadn't known at the time, Chuck was a small-time crook.  In fact, soon after Chuck took possession of Mr. Wallace's home, Chuck started stealing Mr. Wallace's mail.  One of the letters Chuck had stolen was written by "Bob", a personal banker from the Cayman Island Bank where Mr. Wallace maintained his account.  Bob had written to Mr. Wallace about a lucrative investment opportunity.


The Identity Theft
Surmising from Bob's letter that Mr. Wallace had a sizable bank account, Chuck wrote to Bob pretending to be Mr. Wallace.  As the sanitized copy of Chuck's First Letter can only partly demonstrate, Chuck had assumed Mr. Wallace's identity in that particular letter by forging Mr. Wallace's signature.  To comfort Bob, Chuck's First Letter had also asked Bob for the minimum balance required to keep Mr. Wallace's account open. Chuck's "softening up" letter further suggested to Bob that Mr. Wallace's funds might soon be needed "at very short notice" for an alleged real estate deal in Mexico.  In the sanitized copy of Chuck's Second Letter, Chuck again pretended to be Mr. Wallace as he wrote to Bob at the Cayman Island Bank.  In his Second Letter, Chuck directed the wire transfer of Mr. Wallace's funds from the Cayman Island Bank to Chuck's own bank account in Mexico.


When Mr. Wallace next unexpectedly arrived at the Cayman Island Bank to make a cash withdrawal, he was shocked to learn that his account had been drained.  The Bank then showed Mr. Wallace "his" letters and explained that it had remitted his funds to Mexico just two days earlier because of "his" instructions.  Concluding that his identity had been taken over by Chuck, Mr. Wallace apologized for his error and immediately booked a flight bound for Miami.  Shortly thereafter, Mr. Wallace was arrested while fleeing from his Miami home after having killed Chuck there.


The Investigation
Investigators from the U.S. next paid a visit to the Cayman Island Bank.  Although they had first thought that Chuck had been the true beneficial owner of the Cayman Island account, they discovered that Mr. Wallace was.  Investigators also learned that Mr. Wallace was not just simply a real estate developer involved in a tax fraud / abusive offshore tax avoidance scheme.  Instead, Mr. Wallace was actually a major illegal narcotics trafficker hiding the proceeds of his drug crimes through money laundering.  Investigators finally concluded that much of the foregoing had happened because the Cayman Island Bank had among many other things:

  1. Inadequate customer identification procedures / know your customer rules;
  2. Permitted Mr. Wallace's account to be opened by mail & also with a  "0" balance;
  3. Neglected to contact a single reference mentioned in Mr. Wallace's account opening documents;
  4. Failed to recognize suspicious activities like the wire transfer of the $6.3 million from Panama or Chuck's "softening up" letter.

Copyright 2008 Fred  L. Abrams

Offshore Bank Accounts In Liechtenstein

As the CNBC article"Europe Tax Evasion Probe Going Global" mentioned, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has disseminated a list with about 1400 suspected tax cheats on it, all of whom maintained offshore bank accounts through Liechtenstein's LGT Group.  According to the article, an LGT employee stole the list in 2002 and eventually sold it to Germany's foreign intelligence agency.


"Europe Tax Evasion Probe Going Global" also indicates that the 1400 on the list may have hidden assets and / or income from the domestic tax authorities of Germany, the U.S., Britain, Australia, Italy, France, Sweden, Canada and others.  Although LGT's February 24, 2008 press release, refuted the idea that all 1400 on the list were tax cheats, some of them may soon find themselves indicted for tax fraud in the U.S.  This could be true because the IRS announced in its February 26, 2008 press release, that it was "initiating enforcement action involving more than 100 U.S. taxpayers" on the list.


Last week a national newspaper telephoned me about the list of 1400 suspected tax cheats.  The newspaper wondered if it could retain me to somehow acquire a copy of the list.  Although I was unable to assist the newspaper, I contacted "Roger", the former intelligence officer mentioned in my post "Following The Money Trail In Zürich".  


"I have no interest in helping reporters, but if you want, maybe I could make a few calls", Roger said during our conversation about the list.  When I told Roger that as many as 600 on the list may have been Germans, he added:  "Because the German border is next to Liechtenstein, people would sometimes try to smuggle cash across it in the trunks of their cars.  Once in Liechtenstein, a suitcase full of cash could easily be deposited.  That's one reason Liechtenstein was a haven for hiding organized crime monies.  Liechtenstein has been the back pocket of Germany for years."

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act & An Asset Search

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et. seq., protects the privacy of customers who provide information to U.S. financial institutions.  Although there are some important exceptions mentioned at 15 U.S.C. §6821(c) - (g), GLBA restricts access to  "nonpublic personal information" like bank account numbers, account balances, etc.  In some cases, GLBA can therefore act as a bar to an asset search at a financial institution.


At 15 U.S.C. §6821, GLBA specifically protects personal information at U.S. financial institutions by outlawing pretexting.  This means for example, that it is illegal to make false statements to a bank customer or a bank in order to access protected personal information.   Submitting false documents to a bank, (to obtain the protected information), is also illegal pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 6821.  Soliciting a person to use false pretenses to access the protected information at a bank, is also prohibited.


Violating GLBA is punishable pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 6823 by a criminal fine or imprisonment of up to five years.  In aggravated cases, fines may also be doubled and imprisonment can be for up to ten years.  As NXIVM Corp. vs. Rick Ross, U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey, Index # 06-CV-01051 demonstrates, a GLBA violation can however, also be alleged in a civil court case.  Although the NXIVM case was commenced as a trademark / copyright violation claim against Mr. Rick Ross, Mr. Ross filed a Verified Counterclaim alleging that NXVIM had illegally obtained his bank and other private information by hiring Mr. Juval Aviv of the Interfor private investigation firm.


According to allegations at page 8, paragraph 27of the Verified Counterclaim, Mr. Aviv had bribed a Fleet Bank employee to access Mr. Ross's personal bank information.  The Counterclaim alternatively alleged that Mr.Aviv had engaged in pretexting to illegally acquire the Fleet Bank information.  Mr. Aviv however, has denied any wrongdoing In his November 7, 2007 Reply filed with the Court.  As of the time of this writing, the foregoing claims have not yet been fully adjudicated by the Court.


Copyright 2008 Fred L. Abrams

Nathan Vardi's News Beat, Money Laundering

Mr. Nathan Vardi is an associate editor at Forbes Magazine and his news beat is money laundering.  His articles describe how drug dealers have sometimes used American Express, BankAtlantic, Union Bank of California / UnionBanCal and other U.S. financial institutions to launder money:

To help prevent the very kind of money laundering Mr. Vardi's articles discuss, U.S. financial institutions are required to report suspicious financial activity.  As discussed by my post "Terrorist Financing, Money Laundering & Financial Intelligence Units ", Suspicious Activity Reports must be filed with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network pursuant to 31 C.F.R. Part 103.18 and 31 U.S.C. §5318 {g}.  U.S. financial institutions must additionally have an effective anti-money laundering program under 31 U.S.C. §5318 (h) (1) and 31 C.F.R. Part 103.120.


As Mr. Vardi's articles also explain, American Express, BankAtlantic, Union Bank of California and others were investigated  or fined because of shortcomings in their anti-money laundering programs.  American Express for example, was fined $25 million on August 3, 2007 by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network for inadequately reporting suspicious activity and lacking an anti-money laundering program.  American Express however, ultimately ended up forfeiting or paying a total of $65 million as a government fine in a deferred prosecution agreement announced August 6, 2007.  Meanwhile, BankAtlantic paid a total of $10 million in fines pursuant to its own deferred prosecution agreement announced April 26, 2006.  As a related Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Decision also explained, the $10 million was assessed because BankAtlantic had failed to properly report suspicious activity and maintain its anti-money laundering program.
 

Pursuant to a deferred prosecution agreement mentioned by a September 17, 2007 press release, Union Bank of California similarly forfeited / paid a total of  $31.6 million to settle claims that it too had violated anti-money laundering laws.  Included in said settlement was a $10 million fine imposed by a September 14, 2007 Decision from the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.  According to the September 14 Decision, Union Bank of California had failed to maintain internal controls regarding its Suspicious Activity Reports. As the Summary at page 2 of that Decision also explains, Union Bank of California had ignored critically important money laundering indicia: 

"Union Bank failed to implement an adequate anti-money laundering program reasonably designed to identify and report transactions that exhibited indicia of money laundering, or other suspicious activity, considering the types of  products and services offered by the Bank, the volume of its business, and the nature of its customers."

As more fully set forth by my post "Asset Search Indicia For Divorce, Debt Collection & Bankruptcy", the money laundering indicia are described at pages 19-23 and Appendix "F" of the Bank Secrecy Act / Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual, and by several other authorities.

Using Multiple Jurisdictions To Launder Money

Parking assets offshore in one jurisdiction and then exercising control over them through another, sometimes indicates money laundering.  One example of how multiple jurisdictions were used to facilitate money laundering, is the case of  U.S.A. v. Proceeds of Crime Transferred to Certain Domestic Financial Accounts, Index # 07-CV-21791, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida.  As mentioned by a July 16, 2007 press release, the Government commenced  the U.S.A. case in order to forfeit $110 million which had been part of a tainted $400 million court award in Italy.  According to both the foregoing press release and Reuters, the $400 million was tainted because the Italian Court awarded it after an interested party, (Mr. Angelo "Nino" Rovelli), had bribed its judges.


As an amended complaint in U.S.A alleged, Mr. Rovelli's wife Primarosa Battistella, had used Swiss bank accounts and three prominent lawyers, (Attilio Pacifico, Giovanni Acampora and Cesare Previti), to pay the bribes.  After Mr. Rovelli died in 1990, Ms. Battistella finally inherited the tainted $400 million in January 1994.  According to the amended complaint, she then had her accountant Mr. Pierfrancesco Munari, launder a substantial amount of it.  Mr. Munari had allegedly placed the tainted money in financial institutions and /or business entities which acted as laundering links in: the United States; the British Virgin Islands; the Cayman Islands; Guernsey; Jersey; Switzerland; Luxembourg; Liechtenstein; Singapore; the Cook Islands and Costa Rica. 


Some of the money laundered by Mr. Munari had allegedly been hidden in Florida via nineteen financial accounts. The government therefore asserted in U.S.A., that forfeiture was appropriate pursuant to the following:

  • 18 U.S.C. §984-- Asset forfeiture of identical property within one year of a laundering offense, etc;
  • 18 U.S.C. §1957-- Money Laundering of property from specified unlawful activity;
  • 18 U.S.C. §2314-- Interstate or foreign transfer of property obtained by fraud;
  • 28 U.S.C. §1345-- U.S. District Court jurisdiction where the Government is plaintiff;

After the judge in U.S.A. froze / restrained numerous financial accounts in July 2007, Ms. Battistella and other Rovelli family members eventually executed a settlement agreement consenting to the forfeiture of thirteen accounts.  As Mr. Munari's own settlement agreement further demonstrates, he too consented to forfeit an additional four accounts.  Although on November 21, 2007 the Court issued a Final Judgment of Forfeiture regarding the total of seventeen financial accounts, there may still be some unresolved issues.  According to Forbes.Com, a grand jury has been convened in Florida to examine whether Mr. Munari's money laundering scheme criminally involved: Wachovia; Citigroup; Merrill Lynch; Morgan Stanley; Lazard and others. 


Copyright 2007-2008 Fred L. Abrams

High-Risk Locations & An Asset Search

An investigation of a high-risk geographical location can sometimes uncover assets which have been hidden through: nominees; shell companies; cash couriers; wire transfers; credit cards; underground bank or remittance systems like hawala, etc.  For example, one way the IRS focuses on high-risk locations like tax havens, is to compare the banking information it receives from the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network with the foreign bank disclosure taxpayers make pursuant to their Form 90-22.1, the Foreign Bank and Financial Account Report.  The IRS also makes U.S. residents with offshore credit / debit cards an audit priority pursuant to its Offshore Credit Card Program.


The State Department is similarly concerned with high-risk offshore locations as demonstrated by part of its 2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Major Money Laundering Countries.  U.S. banks too make geographic location a risk factor in their anti-money laundering programs.  As explained at page 21 of the Bank Secrecy Act / Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual: "U.S. banks should understand and evaluate the specific risks associated with doing business in, opening accounts for customers from, or facilitating transactions involving certain geographic locations."


The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network also deems seven U.S. regions to be High Intensity Financial Crimes Areas because of their extraordinary vulnerability to money laundering.  Law enforcement may even commit additional resources to scrutinize financial transactions in such regions or in a High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area.  As my post "Domestic Shell Companies & An Asset Search" further suggests, jurisdictions like Delaware, Nevada, Wyoming, and Oregon are additionally considered to be high-risk because assets are so easily concealed through shell companies formed there.


The isolated fact that a financial transaction has a nexus to a high-risk location does not however necessarily support the conclusion that assets have been concealed.  A judgment debtor, divorcing spouse, etc. should still be thoroughly investigated to ensure that an offshore or domestic high-risk location has not been used to hide assets.


Copyright 2007 Fred L. Abrams

Fighting Financial Fraud At UK Banks

In the United States, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network regulates the customer identification procedures, (a.k.a  "know your customer rules"), at banks.  In order to clarify these procedures, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network issued guidance in January 2004.  These customer identification procedures codified at 31 C.F.R Part 103.121, demonstrate  that there is no discretion as to what information is needed when a new bank customer opens an account.  In the case of a customer who is a U.S. person for example, the minimum requisite information includes: a taxpayer identification number issued by the Internal Revenue Service (i.e. social security or employer identification number); date of birth; residential or business street address; etc.  After obtaining this kind of information, a U.S. bank must then verify it based on a "risk-based" approach.


The United Kingdom similarly has rules for checking the identities of its bank customers.  For example, the regulatory body for the financial services industry in the United Kingdom, (the Financial Services Authority or "FSA"), has published its know your customer rules in Discussion Paper 22, at pages 9-13.  This past July, the FSA also published a consumer leaflet mentioning these rules, "Just the facts about proving your identity".  The FSA's leaflet explains that UK law requires an identity check when a new customer opens a bank account and that checking identities helps prevent money laundering, identity theft and terrorist financing.  It further advises that: "Neither the FSA nor the law sets out how firms should check identity.  In most cases firms will follow guidance produced by an independent industry body, the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group".  According to the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group, a number of different documents can be used to prove identity such as a: passport; photo-style driver's license; letter from a social worker or care home manager verifying identity; etc.  As of August 31, 2006, the FSA had also replaced its Money Laundering Sourcebook with the guidance now found in its Senior Management, Systems and Controls Sourcebook, at SYSC 3.2.6 et. seq. 


There will however soon be regulatory change with respect to how a bank identifies its customers in the United Kingdom. This is true because the United Kingdom's new Money Laundering Regulations 2007 come into effect on December 15, 2007.  These regulations obligate banks to apply a standard of due diligence, (as determined by a risk-based approach), when they check a new customer's identity.  In many cases, banks will also be required to identify the true beneficial owner of funds.  Since the United Kingdom's rules for identifying bank customers are about to change, I wanted an expert's opinion.  I then called "Mr. London", who has vast experience in the methods used to hide assets as a former vice president of a major global bank in the United Kingdom.  Mr. London knew all about how banks checked their customers' identities, especially because he had been responsible for his bank's financial fraud and money laundering investigations.


During our phone conversation Mr. London expressed his belief that, (despite the prospective change in regulation), money laundering, terrorist financing and other financial fraud would likely continue to increase throughout the United Kingdom.  He also suggested that there was little standing in the way of a determined criminal because of the "complicity or misfeasance" of many banks and the use of nominees to open bank accounts.  Since crimes like money laundering and terrorist  financing often extend beyond just one nation's borders, I was left to wonder just what this meant for all of us.


Copyright 2007 Fred L. Abrams

Terrorist Financing, Money Laundering & Financial Intelligence Units

The Financial Intelligence Units of the 106 different jurisdictions in the Egmont Group, exchange information worldwide to track terrorist financing and fight crimes like money laundering.  Their exchange of information occurs pursuant to the Egmont Group's Principles for Information Exchange (June 2001) and Best Practices for the Exchange of Information (updated June 2004).  Sometimes Financial Intelligence Units ("FIU's") share information from a suspicious activity or suspicious transaction report filed by a bank or other entity.  This can happen especially because FIU's are the repository of the suspicious activity/transaction reports filed in their respective jurisdictions.  


As the World Bank's 2004 report "Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview" mentions, various jurisdictions define suspicious activity differently.  In the United States however, there are extensive rules about filing a Suspicious Activity Report.  Banks in the United States for example, are required by both 31U.S.C. §5318 (g) and 31 C.F.R Part 103.18 to file a Suspicious Activity Report with the FIU known as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.  As 31 C.F.R. Part 103.18 explains, a bank is generally required to file a Suspicious Activity Report within thirty days of a transaction which amounts to at least $5000 and: involves funds derived from crime; or disguises criminal activity; or evades reporting requirements; or has no apparent lawful purpose.  According to Guidance on Preparing A Complete & Sufficient Suspicious Activity Report Narrative, remembering the five "W's", (i.e. who, what, where, when, & why), is particularly helpful when supplying information in a Suspicious Activity Report to a FIU.
  

FIU's also study the methods used to launder money and then develop laundering "typologies" about them.  One such typology, Egmont Group Case Ref: 06058, shows how information about two suspicious trusts collected by the FIU of one country was passed on as a tip to a different country.  Yet another typology, Egmont Group Case Ref: 06063, demonstrates how a FIU analyzed wire transfers from Europe in order to spot two suspected members of a terrorist group involved in the 9/11 tragedy.  Finally, FIU typologies are used by law enforcement and regulators to track emerging criminal trends and develop countermeasures to financial crimes like money laundering. 


Copyright 2007 Fred L. Abrams